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Although the return to capital is a focus of research in both macroeco-
nomics and public finance, each specialty has approached this subject
with an almost total disregard for the other's contribution. Macroeco-
nomic studies of the effect of inflation on the rate of interest have
implicitly ignored the existence of taxes and the problems of tax deprecia-
tion.
1 Similarly, empirical studies of the incidence of corporate tax
changes have not recognized that the effect of the tax depends on the rate
of inflation and have ignored the information on the rate of return that
investors receive in financial markets.
2 Our primary purpose in this paper
is to begin to build a bridge between these two approaches to a common
empirical problem.
The explicit recognition of corporate taxation substantially changes the
relation between the rates of inflation and of interest that is implied by
equilibrium theory. The Fisherian conclusion that the nominal rate of
interest rises by the expected rate of inflation, leaving the real rate of
interest unchanged, is no longer valid when borrowers treat interest
payments as a deductible expense and pay tax on profits net of accounting
depreciation.
3 A more general theory is discussed in the first section and is
used there to analyze the expected impact of changes in inflation with the
tax and depreciation rules in effect during the past twenty-five years. The
Reprinted by permission from Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1978:1,
pp. 61-99.
1. For a review of recent empirical studies, see Sargent (1976). This criticism applies also
to Feldstein and Eckstein (1970), and Feldstein and Chamberlain (1973).
2. The prominent econometric studies include Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963), Gor-
don (1967), and Oakland (1972). Other major empirical studies include Harberger (1962)
and Shoven and Whalley (1972). None of this research refers to either inflation or financial-
market return.
3. One statement of Fisher's theory can be found in Fisher (1930).
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analysis shows that changes in the rate of inflation are likely to be
significantly nonneutral even in the very long run.
Since the long-term interest rate measures the yield available to indi-
vidual investors, analysis of it provides an operational way of studying the
incidence of changes in corporate tax rules. Oddly enough, this natural
way of measuring tax incidence has not been exploited before. The first
section shows how to translate the postwar changes in tax rates and
depreciation rules into the changes in the interest rate that would prevail
if no shifting occurred; it thus lays the foundation for econometric esti-
mates of the actual degree of shifting set out in later sections. This
approach requires separating the effects of inflation from the effects of
tax changes. Since most of the postwar changes in corporate taxation
have been in depreciation rules and investment credits, the effect of these
changes on the long-term interest rate is of obvious importance in deter-
mining their potential stimulus to investment.
In a previous theoretical paper, Feldstein analyzed how an increase in
the rate of inflation would alter the interest rate in an economy in
steady-state growth. Although that model brought out the important
nonneutrality of inflation and the need to revise Fisher's theories to
reflect taxation, its relevance is severely limited by the assumptions that
all investment is financed by debt and that capital goods do not depreci-
ate. Both of these restrictive assumptions were relaxed in a subsequent
paper in which firms were assumed to finance investment by a mixture of
debt and equity and in which capital depreciates.
4 Introducing deprecia-
tion permits an analysis of the effect of allowing only historic cost depre-
ciation for tax purposes. This more general model shows that the way
inflation affects the real interest rate depends on two countervailing
forces. The tax deductibility of interest payments tends to raise the real
interest rate while historic cost depreciation lowers it. The net effect can
be determined only by a more explicit specification of depreciation and
tax rules than was appropriate in that theoretical study. Such an explicit
analysis is presented in the first section below. Equally important, the
empirical analysis of the subsequent sections does not assume that saving
is inelastic or that all forms of investment are subject to the same tax
rules.
The three main sections of our paper might also be regarded as three
separate studies tied together by the common theme of inflation, taxes,
and the interest rate. In the first section, we extend previous theoretical
studies of the interaction of taxes and inflation by making explicit calcula-
tions based on the actual tax rules of the past two decades. These
calculations show how changes in tax rules and in inflation rates have
altered the maximum nominal interest rate that firms could pay on a
4. See Feldstein (1976; chap. 3 above) and Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1978;
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standard investment. An important implication of this analysis is that
Fisher's famous conclusion is not valid in an economy with taxes on
capital income.
The second section is an econometric analysis of the observed relation
between inflation and the long-term interest rate. A novel feature of this
analysis is the use of an explicit predicted inflation variable which is
derived from an optimal forecasting equation based on an ARIMA (autore-
gressive integrated moving average) process, as described there.
The third section studies the effects of changes in tax rules and in pretax
profitability. This section is the most ambitious in its attempt to link the
econometric estimates to the analytic method developed in the first
section. We regard its results as preliminary because all of our estimates
are conditional on specific assumptions about the mix of debt and equity
used to finance marginal investments and about the relative yields on
debt and equity that the market imposes. We believe that it is important
to explore a wider range of assumptions and that our method provides the
correct framework for such an extended analysis.
A brief concluding section summarizes the major findings.
9.1 The Analytic Framework
The central analytic feature of this paper is the operational method of
converting any change in tax rules and in expected inflation into the
implied change in the long-term interest rate that is consistent with a fixed
marginal product of capital. This method is presented in the current
section and is then used (1) to analyze the effects of specific changes in tax
rules, (2) to derive the relevant generalization of the Fisherian relation
between inflation and the interest rate, and (3) to calculate the implied
equilibrium interest rate for each year form 1954 through 1976. These
estimates underpin the empirical analysis in the rest of the paper.
9.1.1 A Simple Illustrative Model
It is useful to begin by analyzing a simple illustrative case in which all
marginal investment is financed by debt.
5 Moreover, the aggregate supply
of loanable funds is taken as fixed.
6 We assume also that all investment is
subject to the same tax and depreciation rules.
7 While these assumptions
do not even approximate reality, they do permit a simple exposition of
our method. Working through this simple case makes it easier to examine
5. That the marginal investments of all firms are financed by debt does not preclude their
using retained earnings to finance investment; this view is developed by Stiglitz (1973, and
1976). For a contrary argument, see Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1979).
6. This implies that the volume of saving is fixed and that the demand for money is
interest inelastic.
7. This assumption ignores, for example, the difference between the tax treatment of
investment in plant and equipment and of investment in residential real estate.156 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
the more general framework with mixed debt-equity finance, an elastic
supply of loanable funds, and differential tax rules.
We start by examining an economy with no inflation and see how tax
changes alter the rate of interest. We then see how the interest rate
responds to inflation under alternative tax and depreciation rules.
The diagram below illustrates the traditional determination of equilib-
rium interest rate (i0), which equates the inelastic supply of loanable
funds (5) to the downward-sloping investment-demand schedule (/). In
the absence of taxes, each point on the investment schedule indicates the
internal rate of return on the marginal project at the corresponding
aggregate level of investment.
8
The introduction of a corporate income tax with proper economic
depreciation and the deducibility of interest payments does not shift this
investment schedule; any investment that could pay a maximum interest
rate of / before the introduction of the tax can pay exactly the same rate
subsequently.
9 In contrast, an investment tax credit or acceleration of
depreciation would raise the maximum potential interest rate on every
project and would therefore shift the investment-demand schedule to the
right to line /'. Given a completely inelastic supply of investable funds
such a tax change simply raises the interest rate without any increase in
investment.
Tax Changes. Analyzing quantitatively the effect of tax changes (and
later of inflation) calls for an operational method of translating tax
changes into changes in the interest rate—that is, a method of calculating
i, in the diagram; the method must be compatible with a fixed marginal
product of capital. To do this, we select a hypothetical "standard invest-
ment" and calculate the internal rate of return under different tax re-
gimes. Consider a standard investment in equipment in which the real net
output declines exponentially at 8 percent a year
1
0 until the project is
scrapped at the end of Tyears; the initial value of net output (a0) is chosen
so that, in the absence of any tax, the project has an internal rate of return
of 12 percent.
1
1 Such a project has net output ao(l + 8)~
f in the fth year of
its life, where a0 is selected to satisfy
8. This is essentially Keynes's formulation of the schedule for the marginal efficiency of
investment. We implicitly assume that mutually exclusive options are described by Irving
Fisher's incremental method and that multiple internal rates of return can be ignored. For a
cautionary note about this procedure, see Feldstein and Flemming (1964).
9. The pretax situation may be described by/' (/) - i = 0, where/' (/) is the marginal
product of investment; a tax at rate T with the deductibility of interest does not change the
implied value of i in (1 - T)/' (/) - (1 - T)I = 0.
10. Note that this is "output decay" and not "depreciation"; see Feldstein and Roth-
schild (1974) for an analysis of these concepts.
11. This is based on our earlier estimates of the pretax return on private investment in
nonfinancial corporations; see Feldstein and Summers (1977). We raised the average return
of 10.6 percent for 1948-76 reported there to 12 percent because we regard that sample
period as overrepresenting cyclically low years, but the choice of any constant pretax rate of






In practice, it is important to distinguish between investments in equip-
ment and in structures because the depreciation rules and tax credits
affect the two very differently; for example, the investment tax credit
does not apply to structures. Our "standard investment" is therefore
specified to be a mix of equipment and structures in the ratio of 1.95 to 1.
n
The specification of equation (1) is used to describe an investment in
equipment with a ten-year life and an exponential decay rate of 13
percent. The net output of the investment in structures is assumed to
decay at 3 percent a year and the structure is scrapped after thirty years;
the output of a dollar's investment in new structures is also chosen to
make the pretax rate of return equal to 12 percent. The standard invest-
ment is a thirty-year "sandwich" project, of which 66.2 percent of the
investment in the first year is in a standard structure and the remainder is
in equipment; the equipment is then replaced at the end often and twenty
years.
The maximum potential interest rate corresponding to any given tax
regime (that is, the value of ix, in the diagram) is defined as the interest
rate that can be paid on the outstanding balance of the loan used to
12. This figure, when used in conjunction with the procedure described below, yields an
investment mix corresponding to the average composition over the past twenty years.158 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
finance the project, where the balance is reduced to zero at the end of the
life of the project. If Lt, is the loan balance at time t and xt, is the net cash
flow of the project during t (except for interest expenses), the internal
rate of return is the interest rate i that satisfies
(2) L/-Lf_1 = iL,_1-x,,r=l, . . . , T
where Lo = 1 and LT = 0. In the special case of the pure equipment
project and no tax, equation (2) reduces to
(3) Lf-L^^iLf.i-floCl + S)-'
The solution of this equation with Lo = 1 and LT= 0 is exactly equivalent
to the familiar definition of the internal rate of return given by equation
When a tax rate T is levied on the net output minus the sum of the
interest payment and the allowable depreciation (dt), the loan balance
changes according to
(4) Lt - Lt_! = i'L,_i~xt + j(xt -dt- iLt_x)
The value of i corresponding to any tax regime is therefore available by
solving for the value of i that is consistent with equation (4) for our xt
"sandwich" with LT = 0 and Lo equal to one minus the investment tax
credit.
Inflation. The preceding method of analysis can also be used to ana-
lyze the effect of inflation on the investment-demand schedule and there-
fore on the equilibrium rate of interest if the supply of loanable funds is
inelastic. More generally, the method can be extended to decompose the
increase in the interest rate induced by a rise in inflation into one part due
to the shift in the demand for funds and one due to a shift in the supply; we
return to this decomposition below.
It is again easiest to begin by examining the case in which marginal
projects are financed by debt only. Consider first the situation in the
absence of taxes. In terms of equation (2) the effect of introducing a
constant expected inflation at rate TT is to raise the future net profit in each
year by a factor (1 + it)
1 and thus to convert the fundamental equation to
(5) Lt- L,_! = iLt_x - (1 + IT)'*,, t = 1, . . ., T
For any sequence of real net profits, the internal rate of return / that
satisfies the initial and terminal equations (Lo = 1, LT = 0) is increased
by exactly the rate of inflation.
1
3 With a fixed supply of loanable funds,
this increase in the maximum potential interest rate on all projects would
raise the equilibrium interest rate by the rate of inflation.
13. There is actually a second-order term; the internal rate of return rises from / without
inflation to (1 + /)(! + n) — 1 = i + IT + iir with inflation.159 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
This Fisherian conclusion is no longer valid when taxes are consid-
ered.
1
4 Equation (4) now becomes
(6) L, - L,_! = iL,_! - (1 + >*)% + T[(1 + IT)'*,
where d{
rn)t is the depreciation allowed for tax purposes when there is
inflation at rate TT. Depending on the depreciation rule, the nominal
maximum potential interest rate may rise by more or less than the rate of
inflation. To see this, it is useful to consider the special case in which there
is no depreciation. Equation (6) can then be written
1
5
(7) Lt - L,_x = (1 - T)/Lr_! - (1 - T)(1 + ir)'xt
This is exactly the same as (5) with the real project output replaced by an
after-tax value, (1 - r)xt, and the interest rate by its after-tax value, (1 -
T)/. The effect of inflation is therefore to raise the after-tax potential rate
of interest by exactly the rate of inflation: d[{\ - i)i]ldix = \,oxdildTt =
1/(1 - T). With the U.S. marginal corporate tax rate of T = 0.48, this
implies that the maximum potential interest rate rises by almost 2 per-
centage points for each 1 percent of inflation. If the supply of loanable
funds were perfectly inelastic, the equilibrium interest rate would also
rise by nearly 2 points.
The same relationship prevails if the asset depreciates and if the
historic cost basis of the depreciation is increased in proportion to the
price level.
1
6 Although this degree of sensitivity of the interest rate may
seem surprising at first, it is easily understood: each percentage point of
inflation permits an increase of 2 points in the interest rate because the
after-tax cost of this increase is only 1 point.
1
7 Moreover, this "excess
adjustment" of the pretax interest rate is just sufficient to keep un-
changed the after-tax return to a lender with the same marginal tax rate.
1
8
The practice of allowing only historic cost depreciation reduces the real
value of depreciation allowances whenever the inflation rate increases. It
is equivalent to levying a tax on the accruing increases in the nominal
value of the asset. This extra tax implies that the real net-of-tax yield to
lenders must be reduced by inflation and therefore that an increase in
14. These remarks are developed extensively in Feldstein (1976; chap. 3 above) and
Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1978; chap. 4 above).
15. Note that the asset appreciates in nominal value but there is no tax due on this
appreciation as such.
16. See Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1978).
17. Note that with price-indexed depreciation there is no capital gains tax on the
accruing increase in the nominal value of the assets or, equivalently, on the decreasing real
value of the liabilities.
18. If borrowers were taxed on the real capital gains that resulted from the decreasing
real value of their liabilities, the interest rate would rise only by the rate of inflation. To
leave lenders with the same after-tax real return, the real capital losses that result from the
decreasing real value of their liabilities would have to be a deductible expense.160 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
inflation raises the nominal pretax yield by less than 1/(1 - T). Explicit
calculations of this effect will now be presented.
1
9
Internal Rates of Return with Pure Debt Finance. Table 9.1 presents
the calculated maximum potential interest rate with pure debt finance for
our standard investment under seven tax regimes. The rates are calcu-
lated first on the assumption of no inflation and then on the assumption of
a constant 6 percent rate of inflation.
Consider first the results corresponding to no inflation—column 1 of
table 9.1. By construction, the maximum potential interest rate (MPIR)
in the absence of both taxes and inflation is 12 percent for our standard
investment. Imposing the tax regime that existed until 1954 (a 52 percent
corporate tax rate and straight-line depreciation) leaves the MPIR essen-
tially unchanged at 12.4 percent.
2
0 Successive tax regimes liberalized
depreciation and raised the MPIR. The accelerated-depreciation options
introduced in 1954 were adopted only gradually, but by 1960, the mix of
depreciation patterns implied an MPIR of 13.3 percent. The introduction
of the investment tax credit raised it further, to 14 percent in 1963.
Currently, because of a 10 percent investment tax credit and the as-
set-depreciation-range (ADR) method of depreciation, the MPIR has
reached 14.9 percent.
2
1 The tax changes since 1954 have thus raised the
MPIR by one-fifth of its original value.
2
2
Comparing the two columns of table 9.1 reveals the ways in which
taxation changes the way inflation affects the rate of interest. With no tax,
a 6 percent rate of inflation raises the MPIR by 6 percentage points—
from 12.0 to 18.0. In contrast, with a 52 percent tax and straight-line
depreciation (regime B), the 6 percent inflation raises the MPIR by 9.2
points (from 12.4 percent to 21.6 percent). Thus di/dir = 1.53 in this
regime. Note that a lender (bondholder) thus experiences an increase in
the real rate of return from 12.4 to 15.6 percent. However, since the
personal tax is levied on the full nominal return, the lender will receive a
reduced real return after tax unless his marginal tax rate is less than 35
percent. At a personal tax rate of 50 percent, for example, the real
after-tax yield on bonds falls from 6.2 percent with no inflation to 4.8
percent with 6 percent inflation.
The same pattern can be followed with all of the other tax regimes of
the postwar period. The figures in column 2 show that under every
19. The theory of this relation is discussed in Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1978,
chap. 4); see in particular the appendix to that paper by Alan Auerbach, pp. 59-60 above.
20. The MPIR is increased in the shift from regime A (no tax) to regime B because
straight-line depreciation is slightly more generous than true economic depreciation.
21. The effective rate of tax credit of 9 percent shown in the table differs from the
statutory rate of 10 percent because of limitations on loss offset and carryover. Also, certain
firms and types of investment are not eligible for the credit. In all our work, we use the
effective rate.
22. Note that because interest is deductible, a lower tax rate actually lowers the MPIR,
as illustrated by the tax cut in 1964 (switching from regime E to F).161 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
Table 9.1 Maximum Potential Interest Rate with 100 Percent Marginal
Debt Finance, Alternative Tax Regimes, and Inflation Rates
Percent
Tax Regime (corporate tax rate,







(A) No tax 12.0 18.0
(B) 52 percent; straight-line depreciation 12.4 21.6
(C) 52 percent; accelerated depreciation as of 1960 13.3 22.6
(D) 52 percent; investment tax credit of 5.6 percent;
depreciation as of 1963:4 with Long amendment 14.0 23.7
(E) Same as D, except Long amendment repealed 14.2 23.8
(F) Same as E, except 48 percent 14.0 23.0
(G) Current law: 48 percent; investment tax credit of
9 percent;
3 asset depreciation range 14.9 24.3
SOURCE: Derived by method described in text,
a. See text note 21.
regime, a 6 percent inflation rate would raise the nominal rate of return
by between 9.0 and 9.7 percentage points.
Although the assumption that marginal investments are financed com-
pletely by debt is a useful analytic simplification, the implied interest
rates shown in columns 1 and 2 are clearly inconsistent with market
experience. The real long-term interest rates are not (and never have
been during the postwar period) even remotely close to the high values
presented in table 9.1. We turn therefore to the more relevant case of
investments financed by a mix of debt and equity.
9.1.2 The Interest Rate with Mixed Debt-Equity Finance
Our view of the role of debt and equity finance starts with the observa-
tion that issuing more debt increases the riskiness of both the bonds and
the stocks of the firms.
23 Issuing additional debt thus raises the interest
rate that the firm must pay and lowers the price of its shares. The firm
therefore does not finance all incremental investment by debt but selects
a debt-equity ratio that, given tax rules and investor preferences, mini-
mizes the cost of its capital. If the firm is in equilibrium, the mix of debt
and equity used to finance an incremental investment is the same as its
average debt-equity investment.
2
4 The interest rate than a firm can pay on
23. This view is developed explicitly in Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1979). The
traditional Modigliani-Miller conclusion that the cost of capital is independent of the
debt-equity ratio holds generally only in a world without taxation and bankruptcy.
24. If the firm issues no new equity, it establishes its desired debt-equity ratio by its
dividend policy and its debt-issue policy.162 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
a "standard investment" depends on this debt-equity ratio and on the
relation between the equity yield and the debt yield that is consistent with
the preferences of portfolio investors.
In our analysis, we assume that the ratio of debt to total capital is one to
three, roughly the average ratio of nonfinancial corporate debt to the
replacement value of that sector's capital during the past decade.
Although it would clearly be desirable to extend our analysis to make the
debt-equity ratio endogenous, this generalization must be postponed
until later research.
Our basic assumption about the preference of portfolio investors is
that, because equity investments are riskier than debt investments, port-
folio equilibrium requires a higher yield on equity than on debt. We
consider two variants of the yield differential. First, we assume that the
real equity yield (denoted by e) must exceed the real interest rate (i - TT)
by a constant risk premium, D.
25
(8) e = i - TT + D
We shall examine several different values of D. Our alternative specifica-
tion relates the risk premium to the differences in real after-tax rates of
return to an investor. Computational results analogous to table 9.1 are
presented for both specifications and both are examined in the econ-
ometric analysis below.
If the portfolio investor has a marginal personal tax rate 0, the real
after-tax return on a bond may be written in - (1 - Q)i — TT. Specifying
the real after-tax yield on equity (en) is more complex. Let p be the
fraction of the real equity yield that is paid out and (1 — p) the fraction
that is retained. The part that is paid out is taxed at rate 9 while the
retained earnings are subject only to an eventual tax at the capital gains
rate. We use Qg to denote the "equivalent concurrent capital gains tax
rate"—that is, the present value of the future tax equivalent to taxing the
retained earnings immediately at rate Bg. In addition to these taxes on real
equity earnings, the stock investor must also pay a tax on the nominal
capital gains that occur solely because of inflation. With inflation at rate
IT, the resulting nominal capital gain at rate IT is subject to capital gains tax
at effective rate Qg. The real net return may therefore be written:
^ = [p(l-6) + (l-p)(l-Bg)]e-Bgir
Our after-tax alternative to equation (8) is therefore
(9) en = in + D
or
25. Since we assume a constant debt-equity ratio, changes in the risk premium are not
induced by changes in that ratio. Note also that e includes the real gains that accrue to equity
investors at the expense of bondholders.163 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
(10) %^
= (1 - 0)l - <TT + D
For our numerical calculations, we assume the reasonable values/? =
0.5, 0 = 0.4, and6g = 0.10.
The method of calculating the maximum potential interest rate used in
the pure-debt model (discussed above) can be applied to find the values
of i and e that satisfy either (8) and (9) for our "standard investment."
Note that a firm's net cost of funds (N) is a weighted average of the
net-of-tax interest that it pays and the yield on its equity. In nominal
terms,
(11) N = b(l - T)I + (1 - b)(e + IT)
In the special case of pure-debt finance, N = (1 - j)i; the solution of the
difference equation (6) provides a value for i and, since T is known, for N
as well. More generally, regardless of the mix of debt and equity finance,
the solution of equation (6) can be interpreted as equal to N/(l - T); that
is, it is equal to the cost of funds to the firm stated as if all these costs were
deductible from the corporate income tax.
To calculate the value of i corresponding to any tax regime we there-
fore proceed in three steps. First, we solve equation (6) to obtain a value
of AV(1 - T). Second, we multiply this by (1 - T) to obtain N. Finally with
this known value of N we can solve the two equations simultaneously (11
and 8 or 10) for i and e.
Table 9.2 presents the interest rates corresponding to the pretax port-
folio-balance rule of equation (8). Separate results with and without
inflation are presented for three risk premiums (D — 0.06, 0.08, and
0.04). Note first that the implied interest rates, especially those corre-
sponding to D = 0.06, are much closer to observed experience than the
results based on complete debt finance in table 9.1.
2
6
The numbers in column 1 (zero inflation rate) deserve comment for
two reasons. First, unlike the results in the pure-debt model of table 9.1,
the introduction of the corporate income tax significantly lowers the
implied bond yield. This reflects the payment of a significant tax, which
must reduce both the equity and debt yields. Similarly, in contrast to
table 9.1, the reduced corporate tax rate in 1964 now causes an increase in
the MPIR. Second, the various liberalizations of depreciation and the
introduction of the investment tax credit raise the MPIR. The absolute
increase is smaller than in the pure-debt case of table 9.1, but the
proportional rise is substantially larger.
26. Note that in regimes B through G the values for D = 0.08 and D = 0.04 differ from
the corresponding values for D = 0.06 by 0.016. This constant difference holds to the
three-decimal-place accuracy of our table but is not an exact relation when the corporate tax
rate T changes.164 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
Table 9.2 Maximum Potential Interest Rate with One-Third Debt
Finance and Selected Pretax Risk Differentials for
Alternative Tax Regimes and Inflation Rates
Percent
Tax Regime (corporate tax












depreciation as of 1960
52 percent; investment tax
credit of 5.6 percent;
depreciation as of 1963:4
with Long amendment
Same as D, except Long
amendment repealed































































(G) Current law: 48 percent;
investment tax credit of 9
percent;
8 asset depreciation
range 4.4 10.2 2.8 8.6 6.0 11.8
SOURCE: Derived by method described in text,
a. See text note 21.
The effect of a 6 percent inflation rate is seen by comparing columns 1
and 2. With no tax, the MPIR rises by the full amount of the inflation; a 6
percent inflation raises it from 8.0 percent to 14.0 percent. The presence
of taxes again changes this relation but the effect is very different with
mixed debt-equity finance than in the pure-debt case. In each of the tax
regimes, a 6 percent inflation rate raises the nominal interest rate by only
about 5.5 percent: di/d-n = 0.92. This implies that the real rate of return
on debt falls even for the lender (bondholder) who is not subject to any
personal tax. For a lender who pays a significant marginal tax rate, the
equilibrium real net internal rate of return can easily be negative. Under
regime C, the real net yield to a 50 percent taxpayer falls from 1.45
percent to -1.85 percent. With the most recent regime (G), the 6 percent165 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
inflation rate reduces the real net yield from 2.2 percent to -0.90
percent.
Table 9.3 presents the corresponding maximum potential interest rates
for the net-of-tax portfolio-balance rule of equation (10). Again, the
corporate income tax causes a substantial reduction in the real interest
rate. The liberalized depreciation rules raise this interest rate substan-
tially but, even in the absence of inflation, it remains significantly below
the value without taxes. The most important difference between the
results of tables 9.2 and 9.3 is the greater sensitivity of MPIR to inflation
with the net-of-tax portfolio-balance rule of table 9.3. Comparing col-
umns 1 and 2 shows that a 6 percent inflation rate would raise the nominal
Table 9.3
Percent
Maximum Potential Interest Rate with One-Third Debt
Finance and Selected Net-of-Tax Risk Differentials for
Alternative Tax Regimes and Inflation Rates
Tax Regime (corporate tax
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Same as D, except Long
amendment repealed
Same as E, except 48
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SOURCE: Derived by method described in text,
a. See text note 21.166 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
MPIR by 7.5 percent under regime B, implying di/dir = 1.25; this result is
essentially independent of the differential (D) that is assumed. The faster
writeoffs that are incorporated in the succeeding tax regimes reduce the
extent to which inflation lowers the value of the tax depreciation. The
smaller adverse effect on the value of depreciation raises di/di;; the value
of 1.25 under regime B comes 1.32 with regime D and 1.33 with the
current regime (G).
The maximum potential interest rates shown in tables 9.2 and 9.3 have
two very important implications. First, inflation severely depresses the
real net rate of return (*„) that can be paid to a bondholder on the basis of
our standard investment project. Consider an investor whose marginal
tax rate is 40 percent. Table 9.2 implies that with current law and a risk
differential of D = 0.06, a 6 percent inflation raises the nominal before-
tax return from 4.4 to 10.2 percent, but reduces the real net return from
2.6 percent to 0.1 percent. With the more favorable assumptions of table
9.3, a 6 percent inflation reduces the real return from 2.0 percent to 0.8
percent. This has obvious effects on the incentive to save and to make
risky portfolio investments.
The second implication relates to the firm's incentive to invest. It is
frequently argued that, because their real net borrowing rate has fallen,
firms now have a greater incentive to invest than they did a few years ago.
The calculations of tables 9.2 and 9.3 show that the inference is wrong
because inflation also reduces the maximum real net borrowing rate that
firms can afford to pay on any investment. Table 9.2 with D = 0.06
implies that in the absence of inflation a firm could afford to pay an
after-tax interest cost of 2.3 percent on the standard investment project.
2
7
Inflation at 6 percent reduces the maximum real after-tax interest rate for
this project below zero to —0.7 percent!
2
8 The real net cost of debt finance
must thus fall by 3.0 percentage points to avoid reducing the incentive to
invest. Similarly, with table 9.3, the firm could afford a net interest cost of
1.7 percent in the absence of inflation but only a negative cost, —0.1
percent, with 6 percent inflation. It is clear that the usual way of evaluat-
ing investment incentives in terms of the real net cost of finance is very
misleading with the U.S. tax system when inflation is significant.
2
9
9.1.3 The Effect of a Variable Supply of Investable Funds
Until now, all of our calculations have referred to the same standard
investment project and therefore implicitly to a fixed supply of investable
funds. Moreover, we have assumed that inflation has no effect on the
27. (1 - T)I = 0.52 (0.044) = 0.0229.
28. (1 - T)I - IT = 0.52 (0 102) - 0.06 = - 0.0070.
29. The empirical results of the next two sections suggest that the actual real net interest
rate falls by about enough to keep incentives to invest unchanged despite the low maximum
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supply of loanable funds to the nonfinancial corporate sector. The econo-
metric estimation of the actual effect of changes in the corporation tax
requires attention to both of these issues.
Once again we begin by considering an economy in which there is no
inflation and all marginal investment is financed by debt. The notion of a
fixed supply of loanable funds (the vertical S of line figure 9.1) rested on
the assumption that our analysis relates to the entire economy and that
the supply of saving is interest inelastic. It is important for subsequent
empirical analysis to drop these two assumptions. Our econometric analy-
sis will deal with the long-term corporate bond rate; but the demand for
long-term credit comes not only from business firms, but also from
investors in residential real estate, from state, local, and federal govern-
ments, and from abroad. These investment demands are not directly
affected by the investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation, or
changes in the corporate tax rate. This implies that the supply of loanable
funds to the nonfinancial corporate sector is an increasing function of the
long-term bond yield and that this supply function is not shifted by the
changes in corporate tax rules. This supply elasticity would be increased
by a positive response of domestic saving and international capital flows
to the net interest rate.
Figure 9.2 is therefore a more appropriate representation than figure
9.1. A more liberal depreciation policy (a shift from / to /') has a more
limited effect on the long-term interest rate. The magnitude depends on
Interest rate
Investment
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the elasticity of the supply of loanable funds to the nonfinancial business
sector and therefore on both the relative size of the rest of the debt
market and the degree of substitutability in investors' portfolios.
The ratio of the actual change in the long-term interest rate (i2 - *o)
t
0
the change that would have occurred (/x - i0) if investment and therefore
the marginal product of capital had remained the same thus measures the
extent to which the tax change is shifted from corporate capital to capital
elsewhere and to labor.
Our empirical analysis below focuses on the extent of tax shifting in this
general sense. We look at the tax changes as summarized by the change in
the corporate maximum potential interest rate and ask what impact this
potential change actually had on the yields available to portfolio investors
with uncommitted funds. The ratio of (i2 - *o)
t
0 (*i ~ *o) is analogous to
the definition of the incidence of corporate tax changes used in previous
empirical studies.
3
0 This measure of incidence should be distinguished
from the more general concept of the fracion of the tax change borne by
capital in all sectors. A change in the corporate tax might be borne solely
by capital even though the corporate sector bore only a modest fraction.
3
1
Our estimate of the ratio of (i2 — z'o)to (h ~ *o) therefore does not measure
the shift of the tax change from capital to labor. We return later to
consider how well our empirical analysis of the tax-included change in the
long-term bond rate measures the impact of the tax on the yield to capital
in general and not just on the capital invested in the corporate sector.
To implement this approach, we could calculate the maximum poten-
tial interest rate for our hypothetical "standard investment" under the tax
regime of each quarter during the sample period. This would yield the ir
values of figure 9.2 corresponding to different tax rules. We could then
estimate an equation relating the actual interest rate (i2) to these values.
In practice, however, it is necessary to allow also for changes in inflation
that shift the supply of available funds.
The response of supply to changes in the rate of inflation depends on
three basic factors: (1) the effect of nominal interest rates on the demand
for money; (2) the effect of the real net interest rate on saving; and (3) the
effect of inflation on the real yields available in other forms of investment
open to portfolio investors. Our empirical analysis does not attempt to
disentangle these aspects or to model explicitly the effect of inflation on
yields of alternative assets.
3
2 Instead, we distinguish only between the
changes in the rate of interest caused (1) by the inflation-induced rise in
the nominal rate of return and (2) by all other effects of inflation.
30. See, for example, Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) and Oakland (1972). However,
these authors analyzed the effect, not on uncommitted funds, but on the return of existing
investments.
31. See, for example, Harberger (1962) for an explicit analysis of the incidence of a
change in the corporate tax in an economy with more than one sector.
32. Benjamin Friedman's explicit modeling of the supply of and demand for corporate














This distinction is illustrated in figure 9.3. In the absence of inflation,
the equilibrium interest rate is /0 and investment is /0. The effect of
inflation at rate IT is to raise the investment-demand schedule to /'. In a
pure Fisherian economy, the vertical displacement of this schedule would
equal the rate of inflation: ix - i0 = IT. But with taxes and historic cost
depreciation, this vertical shift is likely to be somewhere between IT and
ir / (1 - T), as it is in figure 9.3. Inflation will also shift the supply schedule
of loanable funds from S to 5'. In the pure Fisherian world, this vertical
displacement would also equal the rate of inflation: i2 — i0 = TT, implying
i2 = i\.
 3
3 More realistically, the supply shift will depend on the three
factors identified in the previous paragraph. The change in the equilib-
rium interest rate will depend on the shifts and the slopes of both the
demand and supply schedules.
As this analysis indicates, an empirical study of the relation between
inflation and the interest rate should not be construed as a test of Irving
Fisher's theory. Wih a complex structure of taxes, Fisher's conclusion
would not be expected to hold. The purpose of an empirical study should
instead be to assess the response of nominal long-term interest rates to
inflation and therefore the effect on real after-tax yields. The statistical
33. Note that if the supply is perfectly inelastic (that is, if the schedule is vertical), the
Fisherian result can occur with no' shift in supply.170 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
analysis presented below therefore begins by trying to measure this
response of the interest rate to expected inflation;
3
4 in terms of figure 9.3,
this coefficient equals (/3 - ig)^. Our analysis can also go further and
estimate how much of the increase in the interest rate would be due to a
shift in the demand for funds with the supply schedule fixed (i4 — i0) and
how much to the shift in supply with a fixed demand schedule (i5 — i0).
With linear demand and supply schedules, this procedure provides an
exact decomposition of the observed changes: i3 — i0 = (i4 — i0) +
The current discussion of the effect of inflation when all marginal
investments are financed by debt is extended and applied below to
investments in which debt finance provides one-third of marginal capital
and equity finance, two-thirds. Our analysis assumes that the debt-equity
ratio is unaffected by the rate of inflation and that the real rates of return
to debt and equity have a constant net or gross differential.
9.2 Estimating the Effect of Inflation
In this section we begin the empirical investigation of the impact of
expected inflation on the long-term rate of interest. As we emphasized
above, we do not regard this as a test of Fisher's conclusion since there is
no reason to expect such a one-for-one impact of inflation on the interest
rate in an economy in which taxes play such an important role. Instead,
our aim is to estimate the net impact of expected inflation on the nominal
rate of interest in order to assess the effect of inflation on the real cost of
capital and the real return to investors. If the supply of loanable funds for
the purchase of bonds were fixed, we would expect the equilibrium
interest rate to rise in the same way as the maximum potential interest
rate. In fact, however, the supply schedule is likely to be neither com-
pletely inelastic nor independent of the inflation rate. Without a much
more detailed analysis, we must regard a wide range of inflation impacts
as plausible a priori.
At this stage we focus on the relation between the interest rate and
expected inflation. The next section introduces the effects of changes in
tax and depreciation rules. Since adding the tax variable does not alter
the conclusion about the effect of inflation, we prefer to start with the
simple specification in which we can concentrate on making expected
inflation an operational concept.
In all of our analyses, we measure the long-term interest rate by an
average of yields on new issues of high-grade corporate bonds, adjusted
to be comparable to the Aaa rate.
3
5 The use of new-issue yields is im-
portant because seasoned issues with lower coupon rates will also have
34. The operational specification of expected inflation is discussed below.
35. Data Resources, Inc., made this series available to us.171 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
lower market yields owing to the more favorable tax treatment of capital
gains. The new-issue yield, however, is influenced by the call-protection
feature, which may make it respond more to inflation rates than it would
otherwise.
The expected rate of inflation is defined in terms of the price of
consumer goods and services as measured by the deflator of personal
consumption expenditures in GNP. In principle, our analysis should
recognize that wage rates and the prices of consumption goods, of invest-
ment goods, and of the output of nonfinancial corporations do not move
proportionately and would be expected to have different effects on the
supply and demand for investment funds. In practice, it is not possible to
include more than one inflation variable and the choice does not alter the
results in an essential way. We use expectations of the consumption price
for three reasons: (1) This is the price that should affect household
decisions. (2) Although firms produce investment and intermediary
goods, they also purchase these goods; the consumption price may there-
fore be a good approximation of the price of sales by the nonfinancial
corporate sector to the rest of the economy. (3) The future movement of
nominal wage rates may be approximated best by the expected move-
ment in consumer prices.
This section develops two approaches to specifying the expected future
rate of inflation. The first uses the familiar distributed lag on past inflation
rates, with the identifying restriction that the weights on past inflation
must sum to one. Recognizing that this restriction may be invalid, we
explore an alternative approach based on a series of separate optimal
forecasts of inflation. In practice, the two approaches lead to very similar
results.
Consider first the distributed-lag approach that has been used ever
since Irving Fisher's own pioneering work on this subject. We posit that
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Substituting equation (13) into equation (12) yields the estimable equa-
tion
(15) z,= 30 + 31.2^-/
The key coefficient 3x is estimable only because of the identifying restric-
tion of equation (14).172 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
Equation (15) was estimated by assuming that the weights on lagged
inflation (that is, / > 0) satisfy a second-order polynomial and that T = 16
quarters; the coefficient of the concurrent inflation rate (y = 0) was
unconstrained. The basic parameter estimates are presented in equation
(16). (The numbers in parentheses here and in the equations that follow
are standard errors.)
16




Pi 1^ = 0.64
; (0.06)
Sample period: 1954:1-1976:4; R
2 = 0.82; Durbin-Watson = 0.21.
16
The identifying restriction that X Wj = 1 implies that px = 0.83.
3
6 With no
inflation, the interest rate would be 3.05 percent; with a sustained (and
hence expected) inflation rate of 6 percent, the nominal interest rate
would rise to 8.03 percent.
Sargent has rightly emphasized that the identifying restriction of equa-
tion (14) may be unwarranted.
3
7 The optimal weights (the wj) depend on
the nature of the process that is being forecast. If the IT, remain constant
for a long time, it is clearly appropriate that the weights sum to unity and
therefore predict that the same IT, will continue. But where the historic
pattern of the ir, is more varied, a different set of weights will be optimal.
Dropping the restriction of equation 14 leaves px in (15) underidentified.
This apparently led Sargent to abandon the estimation of ^1 and to
attempt to test Fisher's conclusion indirectly by examining a rational
expectations model of unemployment.
3
8 We do not think that so cir-
cuitous a route is necessary and propose instead to develop an explicit
optimal forecast measure of expected inflation for use as a regressor to
estimate equation (12) directly.
To derive forecasts of inflation rates, we use the optimal ARIMA fore-
casting procedure of Box and Jenkins.
3
9 We assume that the forecasts
made at any time are to be based only on the information available at that
time. This requires reestimating a separate Box-Jenkins equation for
each quarter based on the observations available as of that quarter. To
36. That is, 0.64 + 0.19, the latter being the coefficient of IT,.
37. See Sargent (1973).
38. Sargent concludes that his indirect evidence was ambiguous. When taxes are recog-
nized, even the theoretical link between Sargent's equation and the inflation-interest
relation is unclear.
39. In principal, of course, the Box-Jenkins procedure is too restrictive and one should
derive forecasts from a completely specified econometric model. Unfortunately, doing so
requires projecting all of the exogenous variables. The more general procedure that
requires estimates of monetary and fiscal policy for many years ahead would not necessarily
yield better forecasts than the simpler Box-Jenkins procedure. See Box and Jenkins (1970).173 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
relax the assumption that inflation rates are generated by the same
stochastic process over the entire postwar period, we specify that the
ARIMA process estimated at each date is based only on the most recent ten
years of data.
4
0 After some preliminary analysis of the data, we selected a
first-order autoregressive and first-order moving-average process. With
the inflation rates measured as deviations from the ten-year sample
means, denoted by ir, this ARIMA process can be written as
(17) TTt = ^)TTt^1 + et-Qet_l
where e, is a purely random disturbance. Equation (17) was estimated by
the Box-Jenkins procedure for changing samples ending in each quarter
from 1954:1 through 1976:4. The minimum mean-square-error forecast
of the inflation rate in quarter t + 1 as of quarter t is
(18) Ttt$^ Ttt+1nt 1-0L
where L is the lag operator.
A striking result of these estimates of the predicted inflation rate,
shown in table 9.4, is the implied change in the sum of the optimal
forecast weights on past inflation rates.
4
1 Because we assume that inflation
rates follow a stationary process, our specification implies that the opti-
mal weights always sum to less than one.
4
2 Until 1970, the implied sum of
the weights was always between 0.30 and 0.40. During the 1970s, the sum
of the weights has risen markedly, from 0.45 in 1970 to 0.55 in 1973 to 0.71
in 1976. Since the mean lag has remained almost constant, the rapidly
rising weights imply an increased sensitivity of the optimal inflation
forecast to recent experience.
4
3 This has potentially important implica-
tions for the changing evidence on the "accelerationist hypothesis" and
other issues that we-shall not explore in this paper.
4
4
The expected inflation rate that affects the long-term interest rate
involves a long horizon and not merely the next quarter. We can use
40. Since our sample begins in the first quarter of 1954, it is not appropriate to use a
ten-year history of inflation that stretches back into World War II. The earliest inflation
observation used is the first quarter of 1947; the sample is extended until a full ten years is
available.
41. It follows from equation (18) that, when the process is represented as an autoregres-
sive process, the sum of the weights is (<f> - 8)(1 - 0).
42. Recall that our estimates are based on deviations from the sample mean so that a
constant inflation rate would eventually be predicted accurately.
43. The mean lag, 1/(1 - 8), was approximately 1.4 quarters until 1970 and has since
been between 1.5 and 1.6 quarters.
44. The coefficients of the distributed lag on past inflation have been regarded as a test of
the accelerationist hypothesis that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. This implicitly
accepts an identifying restriction like our equation (14). The evidence of an increasing
coefficient on lagged inflation might be better interpreted as a changing relation between
past inflation and expected inflation. For evidence of the increasing coefficients on past
inflation in this context, see Gordon (1971) and Eckstein and Brinner (1972).174 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
Table 9.4
Percent
The Long-term Interest Rate and the




















































































SOURCES: The long-term interest rate is an average of yields on new issues of high-grade
corporate bonds adjusted to the comparable Aaa rate. The series was provided by Data
Resources, Inc. The predicted inflation rate is the weighted (discounted) average of ten
years of quarterly Box-Jenkins forecasts (see text).
equation (18) to calculate iteratively a sequence of inflation rates in
future quarters. We define the expected inflation rate nf as the weighted
average of the quarterly predicted inflation rates during the subsequent
ten years, where the weights reflect discounting of future inflation by the
interest rate. Moderate changes in the average period would have no
appreciable effect on our analysis.
4
5
Equation (19) presents the estimated interest rate equation based on
the optimal inflation forecast:
(19) it = 2.9 + 0.94
(0.09)
Sample period: 1954:1-1976:4; R
2 = 0.53; Durbin-Watson = 0.13.
The estimate 0.94 is very close to one and certainly not significantly
different. Thus, this estimate, based on an optimal Box-Jenkins forecast
of future inflation, is very similar to the traditional distributed-lag esti-
mate of equation (16).
Forecasting inflation on the basis of past inflation is clearly more
appropriate at some times than at others. If the reduction in inflation
rates after the Korean War was properly anticipated, the estimates of
expected inflation based on past inflation rates would be too high for the
45. When we return to explicit analysis of the internal rate of return in the next section,
the inflation forecasts can be incorporated directly into its calculation.175 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
early years in table 9.4. We have therefore reestimated equations (16)
and (19) for the period beginning in 1960. The results are quite similar to
the estimates for the entire sample: the weights sum to 0.75 with the
polynomial distributed lag, and the coefficient is 0.88 when the predicted
inflation variable (irf) is used.
The very low Durbin-Watson statistics of our estimated equations
indicate an extremely high first-order autocorrelation of the stochastic
errors. This is just what we would expect in an efficient market for
long-term bonds. The change in the long-term interest rate from quarter
to quarter (and therefore the change in the price of the asset) would be
expected to depend on changes in such fundamental determinants as the
expected inflation rate with a stochastic disturbance that is serially un-
correlated and that therefore cannot be predicted. This serial indepen-
dence in first differences corresponds to the observed high autocorrela-
tion when the level of the interest rate is the dependent variable. The high
autocorrelation of the residuals implies that our method of estimation is
inefficient and that the standard errors are underestimated. We have not,
however, followed the common statistical procedure of estimating the
equation in first-difference form (or, more generally, after an autoregres-
sive transformation) because we believe that doing so would introduce a
substantial errors-in-variables bias. Specifically, we recognize that a vari-
able like irf is only an imperfect measure of expected inflation. Because
inflation (and presumably expected inflation) has changed substantially
during our sample period, most of the variance in the ir
et series will reflect
the variance of the true (but unobserved) expected inflation. A relatively
small amount of "noise" will cause a correspondingly small downward
bias in the coefficient of the irf variable. In contrast, taking the first
differences of the irf series would eliminate most of the systematic com-
ponent of its variance while leaving the measurement error. The result
would be a very substantial bias in the coefficient. In terms of the
mean-square error of the estimated coefficient, it is better to accept the
inefficiency of ordinary least-squares estimation of the untransformed
equation than to subject the estimates to a much more serious bias.
4
6
To explore this view, we did estimate equation (19) with a first-order
autoregressive transformation. The maximum-likelihood procedure im-
plied a serial correlation of 0.99 and parameter estimates as follows:
(20) it = 5.0 + 0.14 < +
(1.8) (0.08)
Sample period: 1954:1-1976:4; R
2 = 0.97; Durbin-Watson = 1.8.
We regard the very low parameter estimate of 0.14 as an indication of the
relative error variance in the quarterly changes in irf rather than as
46. As noted in the text, the substantial autocorrelation does, however, imply that our
standard errors are underestimated.176 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
evidence that the true coefficient of nf is so low. This conclusion is
supported by using an instrumental-variable procedure to estimate equa-
tion (19) in first-difference form:
4
7
(21) i, - /,_! = 0.04 + 0.66 « - <-\)
(0.04) (0.22)
Sample period: 1954:1-1976:4; Durbin-Watson = 1.86.
The estimated inflation coefficient of 0.66 (with a standard error of 0.22)
is much closer to the basic parameter values of equations (16) and (19).
Although our evidence is thus roughly consistent with Irving Fisher's
conclusion that the interest rate rises by the rate of inflation, both the
mechanism and the implications are quite different. The rise in the
nominal rate of interest reflects the impact of the tax and depreciation
rules. Although the nominal interest rate rises by approximately the
increase in expected inflation, the net result is far from neutral. For the
individual lender, the rise in the nominal interest rate is sufficient to keep
the real return before tax unchanged, but implies a sharp fall in the real
return after tax. For example, a lender with a 50 percent marginal tax rate
could find a real net yield of 3 percent in the absence of inflation reduced
to zero by a 6 percent inflation.
Inflation is so not neutral from the firm's point of view. With an
increase in the interest rate equal to the increase in inflation, the real net
interest cost to the firm falls substantially. But, as tables 9.2 and 9.3
showed, the potential real net interest rate that the firm can pay also falls.
There is neutrality with respect to the firm and therefore with respect to
investment only if the actual rate falls by an equal amount. Equivalently,
there is neutrality only if the actual and potential nominal interest rates
rise by an equal amount. If the first rises by more than the second, the firm
must adjust by reducing investment.
9.3 Changes in Tax Rules, Inflation, and Pretax Profitability
We return now to the method of analyzing the effects of changes in tax
rules and inflation rates that was developed in the first section. We extend
this method here to deal with forecasts of changing inflation rates and
with fluctuations in the pretax rates of return.
Our analysis begins by deriving for each quarter between the first
quarter of 1954 and the final quarter of 1976 the maximum potential
interest rate that is compatible with our "standard investment" project.
For this calculation we assume that debt finances one-third of the invest-
ment. One series of such internal rates of return is derived on the
47. The first-difference specification is essentially equivalent to the maximum-likelihood
transformation of equation (20).177 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
assumption of a constant 6 percent risk differential between the pretax
yields on debt and equity. We refer to this variable as MPIR33G to
denote a maximum potential interest rate based on 33 percent debt
finance and a gross-of-tax risk differential. As table 9.2 showed, changing
the risk differential from 6 percent to any other constant would change all
of the internal rates of return only by a constant and would therefore not
alter the regression results; in more formal language, the risk-differential
parameter is not indentifiable on the basis of available experience. A
second series is derived on the assumption of a constant 6 percent risk
differential between the net-of-tax yields on debt and equity; we denote
this MPIR33N. The risk-differential parameter is again not identifiable.
Three factors determine the changes in the MPIR variable from quar-
ter to quarter: tax rules, inflation, and pretax profitability. For each
quarter we use the tax rules that were appropriate for that quarter and
assume that they would not be changed during the life of the project. We
also use an optimal Box-Jenkins forecast equation to obtain quarterly
forecasts of inflation rates on the basis of the information then available.
The tax rules and inflation forecasts are combined using the method
outlined in section 9.1 to obtain an estimated internal rate of return.
In performing that operation, it is also appropriate to relax the assump-
tion that the "standard investment" project has the same pretax prof-
itability in every period. In practice, the actual pretax rates of profit have
experienced substantial gyrations during the twenty-five years.
4
8 A per-
manent rise or fall in the pretax profitability of investment would cause an
equivalent shift in the demand for funds; even a temporary change could
cause some shift. To allow for this possibility, we have also calculated an
MPIR series based on the assumption that the pretax internal rate of
return is not a constant 12 percent but varies from quarter to quarter.
4
9
Our analysis of changing profitability is based on the series for the "net
profit rate" developed in our previous paper (Feldstein and Summers,
1977). This rate is measured as the ratio of corporate profits before tax
plus interest payments to the sum of fixed capital, inventories, and land.
The data relate to nonfinancial corporations and are corrected for
changes in the price level. Both profits and capital stock are net of the
Commerce Department estimate of economic depreciation. We have
interpolated the annual series to obtain quarterly figures.
It would be incorrect to assume that firms extrapolate short-run varia-
tions in profitability to the entire life of their investments. We posit
instead that the demand for funds is based on a cyclically adjusted value
of profitability. Specifically, we follow our earlier analysis of profitability
and relate the profit rate to the concurrent rate of capacity utilization. We
48. See Feldstein and Summers (1977).
49. This is equivalent to changing the parameter a0 of equation (1) each quarter to
recalibrate the pretax rate of return.178 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
then use this equation to estimate the profit rate that would be expected
in each quarter if the capacity utilization were a standard 83.1 percent,
the average for the sample period. This cyclically adjusted profit rate is
then used to recalibrate the maximum potential interest rate for each
quarter. We use the suffix AP to denote a variable expressing the internal
rate of return that has been adjusted for variations in profitability; thus
MPIR33NAP is the MPIR variable that is based on a risk differential net
of tax and that has a varying profitability.
Table 9.5 shows the four MPIR variables corresponding to differentials
gross of tax and net of tax and to fixed and varying profitability. Note that
differences in the average level reflect the risk differential. Variations
over time within each series are therefore more important than differ-



































































































































SOURCE: Derived by method explained in the text.
a. All MPIR variables are based on debt financing for one-third of the investment and risk
differentials of 6 percent. See text for definitions of the symbols.179 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
These MPIR values can now be used to estimate how tax changes affect
the actual long-term rate of interest. If the supply of funds to the non-
financial corporate sector were completely inelastic, the actual interest
rate would be expected to rise by the same amount as the MPIR. In the
traditional language of public finance, the full effect of changes in the tax
rules would then be borne by capital in the corporate sector. More
generally, however, the supply of capital to the nonfinancial corporate
sector is not fixed but is an increasing function of the nominal rate of
interest. The elasticity of the supply of funds to nonfinancial corporate
business and the elasticity of the demand for funds by those firms together
determine how much a tax-induced shift in the demand for funds raises
the return to capital. For a given demand elasticity, the effect on the
equilibrium interest rate of a shift in demand versus inversely with the
elasticity of supply. The greater the supply elasticity, the greater will be
the increase in corporate investment relative to that in the rate of interest.
Although an estimate of the elasticity of supply of funds to the non-
financial corporate sector is not available, the relative magnitude of the
funds raised by this sector is informative. Between 1970 and 1975, the
funds raised in credit markets by all nonfinancial sectors totaled $1,029
billion.
5
0 Of this, corporate bonds accounted for only $107 billion. The
total funds raised by corporations, including bank borrowing and mort-
gages as well as bonds, totaled $334 billion, or only about one-third of
total funds raised. The obligations of state and local governments alone
accounted for $89 billion; net borrowing for residential mortgages was
$253 billion. It is clear that fluctuations in the demand for borrowed funds
by corporations due to changes in tax rules and productivity may be small
relative to the total flow of funds in credit markets. The potential supply
of long-term lending from abroad and the elasticity of financial saving
with respect to the real rate of interest strengthen this conclusion.
Although a more extensive analysis of this issue would be desirable, these
crude figures do suggest that the elasticity of supply of funds to the
corporate sector may be substantial. If so, the effect of changes in MPIR
on the actual interest rate will be correspondingly small.
In using the MPIR variable to estimate the effect on the interest rate of
the shifts in the demand for funds induced by tax changes, it is important
to adjust for the concurrent shifts in supply caused by changes in expected
inflation. To control for such changes in the interest rate, our regression
equation relates the interest rate to the expected rate of inflation (TT*) as
well as to the appropriate MPIR variable:
5
1
50. The statistics in this paragraph are from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal
Reserve System.
51. Our analysis uses both the polynomial distributed-lag specification and the variable
constructed from Box-Jenkins forecasts. Factors other than inflation also shift the supply of
funds available to the nonfinancial corporate sector: (a) shifts in saving behavior; (b) shifts
in liquidity preference; and (c) shifts in the demand for funds by governments, by the rest of
the world, and by investors in residential real estate. Although none of these shifts is likely180 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
(22) it = a0 + «! MPIR + a2-rr*
The coefficient of the MPIR variable can therefore measure the net effect
of tax changes; in terms of figure 9.3, this net effect is (i4 - io)/(h ~ *o)>
o
r
the ratio of the change in the interest rate that would occur with a fixed
supply curve of funds (i4 - i0) to the change that would occur if that
supply were perfectly inelastic (it - i0).
52 The total impact of an increase
of 1 percentage point in the expected rate of inflation can be calculated as
the sum of (1) the coefficient of the expected inflation variable, a2, and
(2) the product of the coefficient of the MPIR variable and the value of
dMPIRIdn implied by calculations leading to table 9.2.
Although time is required to change investment and thereby to alter
the equilibrium return on investment, the prices of bonds and stocks can
adjust very quickly to reflect this eventual long-run equilibrium. A failure
to adjust quickly would otherwise provide opportunities for profitable
speculation. We therefore specify that the interest rate adjusts to changes
in MPIR within the quarter.
The estimated coefficients of equation (22) for each of the concepts of
MPIR are presented in table 9.6. Note first that the evidence favors the
less restricted polynomial distributed-lag specification of shifting inflation
expectations (equations 6-1 to 6-4) over the Box-Jenkins forecast (equa-
tions 6-5 to 6-8) .
5
3 We will therefore concentrate our comments on the
results based on the former specification and return to the remaining
equations afterward. It is not possible to choose between the gross-risk
differential concept of MPIR (equations 6-1 and 6-2) and the net-risk
differential concept (6-3 and 6-4) on the basis of the goodness of fit of the
equations.
5
4 Similarly, the evidence does not favor either the MPIR
variable based on constant pretax profitability (6-1 and 6-3) or that based
on changing profitability. Fortunately, the same basic conclusions are
implied by all four specifications.
First, a shift in the demand for funds appears to raise the long-term
interest rate by approximately one-fourth of the increase in the MPIR; a
rise of 100 basis points in MPIR would thus raise the long-term interest
rate by approximately 25 basis points.
5
5 This indicates that the supply of
to be caused by the changes in the tax rates that shift the demand by nonfinancial corporate
business, we cannot be certain that the shifts in supply that are not caused by inflation are
uncorrelated with our explanatory variables.
52. This method assumes that the response of the interest rate to a change in the demand
function is the same regardless of the cause of the shift—tax rules, inflation, and pretax
profitability.
53. This may reflect the fact that the MPIR variable already contains the Box-Jenkins
inflation forecast.
54. The R
2 values are extremely close; although this is not itself an accurate guide in the
presence of high serial correlation, the Durbin-Watson statistic and the R
2 together imply
that the evidence offers little basis for choice between the models.
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CO182 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
funds to the corporate sector is quite elastic. Apparently, investment
incentives aimed at the corporate sector do raise investment rather than
dissipating because of offsetting increases in the return to debt and equity
capital. In terms of figure 9.3, the estimate implies that i4 - i0 is only
about one-fourth of ix - i0 because the expansion of corporate invest-
ment reduces the pretax rate of return on investment.
5
6
The extent to which the increase in corporate investment represents an
increase in total national investment depends on the offsetting effect of
the higher interest rate. If the total supply of investable funds were fixed,
traditional investment incentives would succeed only in transferring in-
vestment to corporate business from other sectors, such as homebuilding.
But the supply of investable funds is not fixed. Total investment can
increase because savings rise, the net international capital flow to the
United States increases, or the government reduces its deficit. Indeed, a
principal rationale for investment incentives has been to maintain aggre-
gate demand with a smaller government deficit. The effect of tax-induced
changes in MPIR on total national investment requires an analysis that
goes beyond the current framework.
The present study can also provide only partial information about the
incidence of changes in the corporate tax rules. The estimate that ax is
approximately 0.25 suggests that only a small part of the increase in
MPIR is shifted to the corporate bondholder. The more general question
of the extent to which the incidence of the tax change is shifted from
capital in general to labor cannot be answered accurately on the basis of
current information. The answer depends on the change in the return to
capital outside the corporate sector and on the share of the corporate
sector in the total capital stock. Consider, for example, a change in the
corporate tax that implies an increase of 100 basis points in MPIR and
that causes a rise of 25 basis points in the long-term bond rate. If the
return to all other forms of capital also increased by 25 basis points and if
corporate capital accounted for one-third of the total privately owned
capital stock, 75 percent of the benefit of the tax change would fall on
capital and 25 percent on labor.
5
7 Since corporate bonds and other secu-
rities are not perfect substitutes, it would probably be more reasonable to
assume that the average rise in the yield on capital is less than 25 basis
points. This in turn would imply that capital as a whole bears less than 75
percent of the effect of stimulative changes in corporate tax rules. The
remainder would be shifted to labor through the higher productivity and
56. Hall and Jorgenson (1967) are not far from the truth in their assumption that the
interest rate remains constant when tax incentives vary; to the extent that their assumption
is wrong, they overstate the tax-induced changes in the desired capital stock.
57. More generally, the share of a corporate tax change that is borne by capital in general
equals the rise in the average return to capital (relative to the change in MPIR) divided by
the corporate share of the capital stock.183 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
wages that result from increased investment. This estimate must be
regarded as preliminary and subject to substantial error.
The estimated effect of changes in expected inflation support the
conclusion of the second section that the long-term bond rate rises by
approximately the same amount as the increase in inflation. Although the
corporate MPIR variable rises by about one-fifth more than the increase
in inflation, the effect of inflation on the supply of funds to the corporate
sector implies that the net change is smaller than this. In terms of the last
diagram, if the investment-demand schedule is shifted by inflation alone,
h ~ h would exceed IT. But ix — i0 is found to be approximately equal to
IT, which implies that inflation substantially reduces the real net return to
lenders.
We turn finally to the estimates of equations (6-5 to 6-8), which use the
Box-Jenkins variable to indicate shifts in the supply of funds. These
equations provide a less satisfactory explanation of variations in the
interest rate. The results are also quite sensitive to whether MPIR is
adjusted for changes in profitability. With no such adjustment, the results
are quite unsatisfactory.
5
8 In contrast with the cyclically adjusted MPIR
variable (equations 6-6 and 6-8), the results are very similar to the
estimates based on the distributed lag specification of inflation. More-
over, when these equations are estimated in first-difference form (using
instrumental-variable estimation) the parameter values are quite stable.
The coefficient of MPIR33GAP is 0.53 (with a standard error of 0.44) and
the coefficient of ir
e is 0.96 (0.57); with MPIR33NAP, the corresponding
coefficients are 0.31 (0.27) and 0.91 (0.46).
To examine the possibility that the long-term interest rate responds to
cyclical conditions directly, we reestimated the equations of table 9.6 with
capacity utilization as an additional variable. In general, its coefficient
was small and statistically insignificant. In one key specification, corre-
sponding to equation (6-2),, the capacity utilization variable was sig-
nificantly positive (implying that an increase of 1 percentage point in
capacity utilization has the direct effect of raising the long-term interest
rate by 5 basis points) and the coefficient of the MPIR variable was
reduced to 0.07 with a standard error of 0.10. This suggests a further
reason for caution in interpreting the point estimates of the coefficient of
the MPIR variable but supports the conclusion that the actual interest
rate is changed very little by, tax-induced shifts in the maximum potential
rate of interest.
Obviously, the estimates presented in this section must be treated as
preliminary and regarded with caution. However, they offer no grounds
for rejecting the conclusion of section 9.2 that an increase in the rate of
58. The coefficients of the MPIR variables in equations (6-5 and 6-7) are both unreason-
ably high. When these equations are estimated in first-difference form (using instrumental-
variable estimation) the MPIR coefficients become very small and statistically insignificant.184 Interest Rates and Asset Yields
inflation causes an approximately equal increase in the nominal pretax
interest rate. This conclusion supports the analytic results of the first
section that the tax deductibility of interest payments just about offsets
the historic cost method of depreciation. Finally, the results of this
section suggest that the supply of funds to the nonfinancial corporate
sector is elastic enough to make a tax-induced change in the maximum
potential interest rate cause a substantially smaller change in the actual
interest rate.
9.4 Conclusion
The primary emphasis of this paper has been on the interaction of taxes
and inflation in determining the interest rate on long-term bonds. The
current U.S. tax system makes the impact of inflation much more com-
plex than it was in Irving Fisher's time. The basic Fisherian conclusion
that anticipated inflation has no effect on real variables is no longer
correct.
We began our analysis by calculating the interest rate that a firm can
pay on a "standard investment" project if its investment is financed
one-third by debt and two-thirds by equity. The deduction of interest
payments in calculating taxable income implies that this maximum poten-
tial interest rate rises by more than the rate of inflation. Offsetting this is
the use of historic cost depreciation, which makes the MPIR rise less than
the rate of inflation. On balance, we find that the maximum potential
interest rate rises by approximately the same amount as the rate of
inflation, with the sign of the difference depending on the assumption
about the relation between debt and equity yields.
Our econometric estimates of the relation between inflation and the
long-term interest rate confirm that the nominal rate rises by approx-
imately the rate of inflation. This implies that the real interest rate net of
tax available to investors is reduced dramatically by inflation. For exam-
ple, an investor who pays a 50 percent marginal tax rate will find that a
real net-of-tax return that is 2 percent in the absence of inflation vanishes
when there is a 4 percent rate of inflation.
The fall in the real net rate of interest received by investors also
corresponds to a fall in the real net cost of debt capital to firms. It is
wrong, however, to regard this as a major stimulus to investment. The
analysis of the first section shows that an inflation-induced fall in the real
net-of-tax rate of interest at which firms can borrow is not a stimulus to
investment because, given the tax and depreciation rules, inflation also
reduces by about as much the maximum real net-of-tax interest rate that
they can afford to pay on a standard investment.
Although our analysis has emphasized the interaction between taxes
and inflation, we have also been interested in the effects of corporate tax185 Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-term Interest Rate
changes themselves. The results of section 9.1 showed that the changes in
tax rates and depreciation rules during the past twenty-five years would,
in the absence of inflation, have increased the maximum interest rate that
firms could afford by about 2 percentage points. Our econometric esti-
mates in section 9.3 suggest that the elasticity of the supply of funds to
purchase corporate debt is great enough that the interest rate actually
rises by only about one-fourth of the potential increase induced by
changes in corporate rules. The tax changes that were designed to stimu-
late corporate investment were therefore not offset by the resulting
increases in the interest rate.
We believe that we have a useful analytic method for studying the
effect of alternative tax rules. By translating the changes in tax rules and
inflation into corresponding changes in the maximum rate that firms can
pay for capital, we can study the changes in investment incentives and in
the response of market yields. We plan to extend our analysis to include a
more general model of corporate finance and to study a wider range of
problems.